INTRODUCTION
All natural languages allow reference to places, expression of spatial relations and localization of objects and events. The specific devices which they have developed to that purpose vary considerably. This may also be true for the underlying concept of space (Malotki, 1979) , but there are some general features, as well. Two of them are particularly relevant to the question of how human experience is reflected in language structure. First, place reference, or local reference, is typically not obligatory. Its expression or lack thereof is left up to the speaker. Temporal reference, on the other hand, is very often obligatory. It is a built-in feature of many languages. With a a few exceptions, utterances in these languages will be "tensed." Second, all languages exhibit two strategies of local (and often other) reference, one of them rooted in the actual speech situation (deictic reference) and the other one not.
I have nothing to say here about the asymmetry between temporal and local reference, except that it is a mystery and casts some doubt on the truism that time and space are equally fundamental categories of human experience : at least, the marks they have left in the structure of very many languages, including the familiar Indoeuropean languages, are not equally deep. 1 The difference between deictic and non-deictic reference is best exemplified by two series of expressions. The references of "here," "there," "left," "right," "on the other side," "yonder," etc. crucially depend on the position of the speaker at the time of utterance, that is, on factors of the actual speech situation. The references of "in Minneapolis," "east of Eden," "where the beautiful trumpets are blown," etc. are independent of the speaker's position. Closer inspection shows that the distinction between deictic and non-deictic reference raises many problems and that both procedures are based on a complex interplay between linguistic and contextual knowledge. This paper deals with one of these procedures, namely local deixis. First, I shall briefly outline some of the components that, in my view, are involved in the use of deictic expressions. It is not my aim to develop, or even to sketch, a new theory of deixis, but to point out some necessary prerequisites for such a theory, and to emphasize the need for the empirical study of deictic phenomena in actual language use. Then, some results of an empirical study about the use of spatial expressions in route directions will be reported. This study is based on authentic route directions in a German city. It will be complemented in the final section of the paper by some findings about route directions in children based on a more controlled study.
SOME PREREQUISITES FOR THE ANALYSIS OF LOCAL DEIXIS Prelude
We can refer. The classical examples of referring expressions are proper names, like "John," and definite descriptions, like "the Queen of England." Using these expressions in an utterance is not enough for successful reference; there are millions of Johns, and there have been up to now five Queens of England. But an utterance is regularly embedded in a discourse context, and such a context puts strong restrictions on the possible referent. Successful reference in natural language always results from an interplay between contextual information and information provided by the referring expression itself. It may be that the context leaves certain options, that is, several Johns, or several Queens of England might be at issue when the reference has to be made. In this case, the information given in the utterance has to be extended, for example, by saying "your uncle John" or "the present Queen of England." The additional expressions "your uncle" and "present" link "John" and "Queen of England" to factors of the speech act; namely to the listener and to the time of utterance, by which it is assumed that they are determined. Relating expressions to the speech act itself is one of the most common devices of natural language for establishing reference. There are other possibilities, for example, mentioning more and more attributes of the intended referent, such as "that John who..." or "that Queen of England who...." Following Bühler (1934) , we might call these techniques "deictic" and "symbolic," respectively. Both techniques are often applied simultaneously, such as in "your uncle," in which "your" plays the deictic part and "uncle" the nondeictic or symbolic part. This interplay is just one example of the general interaction between contextual information and information expressed in the utterance, which characterizes the functioning of natural language.
The role of deictic expressions like "your" or "present" is that of linking the information expressed in the proper name (or the definite description) to some component of the context-more specifically: situational information, namely the "listener ("your") or the time of utterance ("present"); they are mere aids for unique identification of entities which, as such, are well-distinguished. That is, there are millions of beings to which the name "John" applies, but there is no doubt that these beings are distinct in various properties, and either by naming the specific properties of one of them, or by characterizing it with respect to situational factors, the referent is identifiable. But the role of deixis goes beyond that of being a descriptive aid. Our concept of "individual" itself and hence of the possible objects of reference crucially depends on deictic features.
Close your eyes and imagine a little red square. Fine. You are reading again, I presume. Now, keep the square, close your eyes again (not yet) and imagine a second, identical square beside it (now). Now you can open your eyes again.
The two squares only exist in your imagination. No one but you knows their exact size or their exact colour. But I can refer to them. I can say, for example, "Think them away." Then, "them" means "the two little red squares which I asked you to imagine." I can also refer to either of them individually, although they are identical in all their attributes: they are both little, red, rectangular, and have sides of equal length. So, I can't use their properties. I can't use their position, as I could do if they were drawn on a blackboard or printed in a textbook. They have no material substance which would "individualize" them, according to a classical doctrine ("materia est principium individuationis"). They have no names, and no definite description using their attributes, like shape, size, color, can distinguish them. Individuum ineffabile est.
The only way to keep them separate and to refer to them individually is through deixis. I can say, for example, "Erase the first square" or, "Put a triangle on that square which, in your view, is on the left*" The expressions "first" and "in your view on the left" relate the square in question to factors of the speech act. The only "properties" which make the squares two individuals, two different entities in the set of possible referents, are deictic features.
These brief and rather superficial considerations may suffice to illustrate two points. First, that natural language use is characterized by a persistent linking to the here and now of the utterance itself, and second, that this linkage is not specific to language use but rather a general feature of human cognition.
Both claims are rather unspecified. In the following paragraphs, I shall try to detail the first of them. The second aspect will not be dealt with systematically, but will be touched upon at various points.
Contextual Information and Expression Information
The content of some expressions ("expression information") is integrated into the general flow of information one dispenses. Let us call this information "contextual information." For heuristic purposes, it is possible to distinguish three types of contextual information:
1. One may be derived from the immediate verbal context, that is, the immediately preceding and possibly the immediately following utterances. A most typical case, in which information derived from verbal context plays a crucial role is that of anaphoric devices. In "My father is a fool, because he married my mother," the anaphoric element "he" only expressed, qua expression information, is something like "male person," but it takes up the information introduced by the expression "my father." The expression information introduced by "my father" functions as contextual information for everything that follows.
2. Another may be derived from the perceivable situation in which the utterance is made, that is, from the speech act and the various factors that constitute it. We may perceive who is speaking, who is addressed, who else is present, where the utterance is made and when. This information which is given by immediate perception in the speech act is the root of the whole deictic mechanism.
3. And another may be derived from what we have experienced or fancied before, stored in our memory and activated at the occasion of the speech act. That is, this information is part of what is sometimes labelled "world knowledge" or "factual knowledge." Information of this sort also plays a crucial role in deixis, as we shall try to show now.
Deixis is one special device used in integrating expression information (as expressed by words like "here," "there," "left," etc. in the case of local deixis) into the whole of contextual information. To illustrate with a simple instance: Suppose someone says in a certain situation "I like it here." Knowing English and thus knowing what the expression "here" means is not sufficient to understand where that person likes it. "Here" by and large means "at a place close to the position of the speaker." Hence, in order to understand what is referred to by the speaker, we must know his position which could be supplied by perception in that situation. But such information is not enough. "Here" could mean "in this chair where 1 am sitting," "in this corner of the room," "in this street," "in this city," "on earth." Hence, we must know what the possible denotata-various places in this case-are, and moreover, we must have some additional information which selects the "border" of the supplied by verbal or by perceptual context. For example, if is given by our world knowledge, which tells us that the referential domain -the deictic space -is structured in a certain way. The second kind of information is usually supplied by verbal or by perceptual context. For example, if the speaker of "I like it here" is sitting on the floor and was just offered a chair, his utterance is most likely understood as, "I like it on the floor," but not "I like it in New York," whereas this interpretation would be far more plausible if, in the same situation, he was asked, "How do you find New York?" (assuming that he is there at the time of the utterance). So far, we have four components which contribute to the functioning of deixis:
1. A basic reference point which, at least in this case, is the position of the speaker. Following Bühler's (1934) terminology, we shall call this basic reference point the origo of -in this case -local deixis. 2. A deictic space, that is a set of possible referents (places in this case). This set has a certain structure, e.g., some of its elements are enclosed in others, relations like "close to" must be defined, etc. This information is supplied by our general knowledge of the world.
3. Some delimitation principles which allow us, in a given situation, to determine how far the borders of the "here" should be drawn. The necessary information has to be derived from previous utterances or from situational context.
A. The lexical meaning of the expression in question. "Here," for example, means a place close to the speaker, etc. We know these meanings simply because we know the language.
In what follows I usually shall speak of "deixis" rather than more accurately of "local deixis" or "place deixis." Determination of origo, deictic space, delimitation principles, and lexical meanings of the expressions used is a necessary presupposition for the functioning of local deixis. But there may be several extensions and complications. First, the origo may be shifted, that is, another reference point may be introduced. Second, the deictic space may be of a much more abstract kind than the one we have considered in the above example; as a consequence, the denotata of the deictic expressions may be of a much more abstract kind. Third, it may be that there is no immediate reference at all, but rather reference to elements in a first deictic space, to which other elements in a second deictic space are associated. This happens for example, when we point to a place on a map and say: "Here is my house." What we really refer to is not the red spot on the map, but some counterpart (analogue) which this spot has in reality (analogical deixis). In what follows, we shall consider the four basic components in turn, together with some possible extensions and complications. We then will briefly turn to analogical deixis.
Deictic Space
The prototypical deictic space. By deictic space, I mean the structured set of possible denotata of deictic expressions. These possible denotata are places, at least in the most straightforward case, such as rooms, apartments, houses, quarters, towns, countries, planets, galaxies.
3 That is, the deictic space is our mental representation of the physical space as structured by visual perception, by our geographical knowledge and maybe other kinds of knowledge about the structure of this space. The possible denotata, then, are more or less delimited subspaces of this space. The deictic space is not the physical space itself, but a mental representation of it. Consequently, deictic spaces may be different for different people, for children and adults, for people with extended geographical knowledge and without such knowledge, etc. For successful communication, the deictic spaces of speaker and listener need not be identical-they probably never are-but they must be sufficiently similar, and to make them so is often a part of the communication itself. This is the usual case in route directions, as we shall see below.
There is a vast literature on mental representation of physical space. I cannot deal here with the various issues raised there, but there are three points which should be mentioned. They are concerned with features necessary for the functioning of local deixis in this deictic space:
1. The deictic space must have a topological structure. We are clearly able to say that certain subspaces are completely within other subspaces, or that they partly overlap, etc.
2. The deictic space must have a kind of metric measure. We definitely have a concept of distance for different subspaces. Otherwise, the distinction between different deictic expressions would be pointless. The difference in meaning between "here" and "there" obviously has to do with one's varying distance to the position of the speaker. The precise nature of this metric measure is unclear, however.
3. The deictic space must have directions, since otherwise it would ne impossible to distinguish the meaning of deictic expressions like "left" and "right," "above" and "below," "before" and "behind."
Extensions. There are a number of cases in which deictic expressions like "here" etc. do not refer to places within physical space (or more accurately, to their mental representations) at all. A typical instance is the sentence which occurred above: "I cannot deal here with the various issues raised there." In this case "here" means something like "in this paper," and "there" means something like "in the vast literature on mental representation of physical space." They do not refer to any locality or place in the literal sense, but to very abstract "places" within a train of thought, an academic tradition of thinking, or whatever the referential domain might be here.
There are cases between (the mental representation of) physical space and the very abstract spaces of the latter example. Take for instance a sentence like: "In 1927, Carnap joined the Vienna circle. Here, he first became acquainted with...." Obviously, the Vienna circle is not a place in physical space, but it seems less abstract than the entity referred to in utterances like "I can't go into detail here."
Uses of the latter kind may be called "derived" or "metaphorical;" this is perhaps correct, but it does not say very much. What we need is an investigation of the cognitive or semantic operations that characterize these (and perhaps other) transitions from representations of physical spaceas they are built up and structured by every non-handicapped person-to these much more abstract spaces. I have no idea what the precise nature of these operations is.
Origo
The prototypical origo. In the unmarked case-that is, if nothing else is mentioned-the basic reference point is the position, or rather the orientation, of the speaker at the time of utterance. In a speaking situation, each participant has at every moment a specific orientation determined by his position and the direction of gaze. The determination of referents is specified by the orientation of the speaker: "here," by and large, refers to a subspace which includes the position of the speaker, whereas "there" refers to a subspace which does not contain the position of the speaker. "Left," by and large, is determined by the speaker's direction of gaze; it refers to a very diffuse subspace which, among other things, is closer to that side of his body where his heart is likely to be. We will come back to this point in the next section.
Both position and direction of gaze may constantly change, either because the speaker himself changes them or because the speaker's role is taken over by someone else. The necessary information about the nature of present origo is supplied by perception. This obviously requires that the speaker can be localized in the deictic space, otherwise the origo must be explicitly introduced. But even if the position of the speaker is clear, a different point which then counts as origo can be introduced. This leads us to various complications. There are a variety of possibilities for deviating from the usual, unmarked origo and for introducing new reference points. Three of them seem particularly worthy of discussion and in addition, I shall briefly consider a fourth case which goes beyond deixis proper.
1. Speech-act-bound origo shift: In a speech situation, every participant brings his own orientation. The one which counts for deixis depends on who is currently speaking. That is, those who are listeners have to take over the orientation of the person who is speaking. Since the orientation of the different participants often differ in irrelevant aspects, this is usually not a problem. There are some cases, however, in which it is the listener's orientation that matters. A typical example would be instructions. For example, if somebody facing somebody else says "Move a bit to the left," it is always meant "left from the listener's position." Since the speaker is facing the listener, the subspace denoted by "left" would correspond to the speaker's "right." We shall see in the third section that this kind of "perspective taking" is the norm in route directions. There are other, less obvious and more confusing cases. Take the following familiar after-lunch utterances: "You have a crumb on your chin. No, more to the right. No, still more to the right. Okay, it's gone." In this case, "to the right" may be interpreted from the speaker's or from the listener's point of view; this may lead to confusion and, as a consequence, to explicit marking of the relevant orientation. The common denominator of these cases is that the speaker guides actions to be performed by the listener, and he directs them from the point of view of the person who has to do them, not from his own. "Origo shift" from speaker to listener seems so common in these "directive" contexts that most often it need not be explicitly marked. It can be marked, of course, if there is some ambiguity; this may happen if the directive character of the utterance is less obvious, such as in the crumb example. We may call this kind of deviation from the normal origo a "speech-act-bound origo shift." 2. Origo shift by pointing: It is possible to introduce a new reference point by a pointing gesture. This happens in utterances like "I would like it better if the door here (pointing) were over there (pointing)." Cases of this sort may correspond to the most literal sense of "deictic" (pointing), but what really happens here is not clear. Rather than claiming that the origo is shifted in these cases, we might argue that both "here" and "there" refer to subspaces which have no immediate link to any origo. The subspace is simply identified by the pointing gesture. But then, the linguistic meaning of "here," rather than its denotatum would be different in different contexts. This is clearly an undesirable consequence.
3. Origo shift by verbal context (anaphoric use): It is also possible, and much more common, to let the denotatum of "here" and "there" depend on some previously introduced referent. This amounts to what is often called "anaphoric use" of deictic expressions. A typical example is "In the evening, we arrived at Heidelberg. Here, we immediately...." This "here" means approximately the same as "in Heidelberg;" it is a kind of anaphoric expression for "Heidelberg." In this context the term "there" may be substituted for "here," and we are faced with the same problem as in (2) above. For the same reason given above, I would prefer to speak of a "shifted origo." In both cases, the origo collapses with the whole denotatum. This constitutes no problem if we assume that the meaning of "here" is approximately "subspace including the origo." How far the borders of this subspace reach and whether or not they include something different from the origo, is left open.
4. Intrinsic origo (non-deictic origo I): In many cases, it is not the constantly varying position of the speaker which is important, but the habitual, frozen position of an individual or object. A car, for example, has a right side and a left side. Sides are defined by the standard position of the driver. It is often said that a car has an "intrinsic" orientation (Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976) . If somebody' is standing beside a car and the speaker is standing in front of the car, he may either say: "He is standing to the left of the car" or "He is standing on the right side of the car." In the first case, he uses the unmarked origo-his own position. In the second case, he uses the intrinsic origo In a recent study on room-descriptions, Ullmer-Ehrich (1981) has shown that the interplay of deictic and intrinsic orientation is much more complex than indicated here and that the choice between them is governed by numerous factors.
Cultural origo (non-deictic origo II):
The deictic system of reference with an unmarked origo is extremely flexible and dynamic. Anybody who has eyes and ears can determine the basic reference point, but it is not stable. It allows no situation-independent referent, no comparison over time, since it changes in time. There are also difficulties when production and comprehension do not collapse into one situation, for example, in written text.
The alternative is an orientation system whose origo is completely independent of the speaker's position. Host languages have developed devices to express this kind of reference. For example, the calendar system for temporal reference or the thumb-system for local reference. These systems and their zero points, their "origins," have to be stored in the world knowledge of their users. They are specific not to certain languages, but to certain cultures; hence, we may speak of "cultural orientation systems" and "cultural origins." Thus, in Western culture, the cultural origo for temporal reference is the birth of Christ, and the cultural origo for local reference is the intersection point of longitude 0 and latitude 0 . In practical application, these systems may be simplified again. For example, if the speaker is entitled to assume that the listener knows where Eden is, he may successfully refer to a place by "east of Eden" rather than using its coordinates.
With the last two examples, we have left the domain of deixis proper. Whereas case (4) may still be viewed as a case of "frozen" deictic origo, case (5) is completely independent of the speech-situation itself.
Delimitation Principles
If we assume that the linguistic meaning of "here" is approximately "subspace including the origo," it is completely left open how far this subspace reaches. This indeed corresponds to the use of "here;" it may refer to the immediate environment of the speaker (in case of unmarked origo), or to the whole world. This openness was first noted in Schegloff (1972) . It raises the following problem: What kind of information makes the borders sufficiently clear in a given instance of "here" (or some other deictic expression) ?
Basically, there are two possibilities. First, additional specifying expression may be added; for example "It is too hot here" may be specified by "It is too hot here in hell." Second, the job may be done by contextual information. Obviously, we must employ some "delimitation principles," since typically the delimitation is sufficiently clear even if there is no specifying expression. It is not clear exactly what these principles are, but at least two factors are involved:
1. The subspace must be interpretable as a plausible cognitive unit, for example a room, but not a room and one third of an adjacent room-unless this latter subspace is interpretable for some reason as a unit. What counts as a cognitive unit may be very different for different speakers or cultures, but there is little doubt that we all have the concept of such units in our world knowledge.
2. The cognitively interpretable subspaces to be selected in a given utterance depend, to a great extent, on verbal contextual information. In "Close the door, please, it is very cold here," the "here" probably refers to a room, or a part of the room, but not to a country or to the whole earth. In "There is no justice here," the situation is exactly the opposite.
Very often the boundaries are not very sharp. This is particularly true for deictic expressions like "on the left," but it also holds true for words like "here" and "there." This is not a problem specific to local deixis, however. Vagueness is one of the most salient, but also one of the most effective features of natural language.
Lexical Meaning
Deictic expressions usually form small subsystems within the lexical repertoire of a language. Thus, "here" and "there" constitute such a subsystem in English, and so do "left" and "right." Other languages have more elements, such as "hic-istic-illis" in Latin or "hier-da-dort" in German (for a survey of various deictic systems, see Weissenborn and Klein, in press).
The lexical meaning of the different elements within such a subsystem are usually characterized by a number of semantic features. Various proposals have been made in this respect (see Lyons, 1977, ch. 15) . The most typical features are based in the distance from the origo. For example, Lyons (1968) uses "proximal" and "remote" to mark the opposition between English "here" and "there." Davis and Saunders (1976) use "proximal-middle-distal" for the Bella Coola system. Other systems also take into account the distance from the listener, or from a third person, or factors such as whether or not the place referred to is in the visual field, independent of its actual distance.
I think this approach of characterizing the lexical meaning of deictic expressions is basically sound and correct. However, it can also lead to difficulties even in the most elementary cases, such as English "here" and "there," whose opposition may be characterized by the feature's "distance from the origo," (or + proximal). The problem is that this feature itself is context-dependent. We can say "Here comes my baby," if the baby is still at a distance of 100 yards, but we also can say "There is my baby," if the baby is at a distance of 10 yards. That is, we would have to assume that the opposition between the lexical meaning of "here" and "there" can be neutralized or even reversed.
An alternative possibility was occasionally mentioned in previous sections. For a given deictic space, "here" always denotes a subspace which includes the origo; nothing is said about the borders of this subspace. "There," on the other hand, denotes some subspace within the complement of the whole deictic space; again, its exact borders are not lexically determined. As a consequence the denotatum of "there" can never include the origo. This accounts for the fact that "there" seems to be more remote from the speaker than "here."
Other, more complex systems may be defined along these lines by including, for example, the position of the listener, by having some features unspecified in respect to these positions, etc. German, for instance, has a tripartite system "hier-da-dort." But these three expressions do not represent three degrees of distance, "proximal-middledistal," since "da" can replace both "hier" and "dort." A more appropriate description could be: "hier" denotes a subspace which includes the origo, "dort" denotes a subspace from the complement (i.e., it must not contain the origo) and "da" may, but need not, include the origo. This is in full accordance with the fact that "da" is by far the most general deictic term in German.
It is more difficult to characterize the lexical meaning of "left" and "right." The canonical dictionary defini-4
It should be noted, however, that there are strong dialect differences in the German deictic system. In my own dialect (Rheinpfälzisch), "hier" simply does not exist. tion is something like, "related to...the side of the body in which the heart is mostly located" (following Webster). This is basically correct, but not fully satisfactory, since what "left" and "right" refer to may change if we turn our head. If we turn our head 90 to the right, all that was previously in front may now be described as on the left. Hence, it seems more plausible to assume that a speaker's origo and direction of gaze split his visual field into two subspaces, one of them including that part of the body in which the heart is mostly located. This subspace is "left," and the other one, "right." This semantic characterization raises a problem for the space behind the speaker. Indeed, it seems that for this space "left" and "right" are not clearly defined. The usual way to overcome this problem is to imagine that we are looking in the opposite direction, behind ourselves. As we shall see later, imaginary changes of origo and direction of gaze are a typical feature of deixis in route directions.
Analogical Deixis
If someone points to some spots on a map and says "here is Lake Michigan, and here is Chicago," he obviously does not want to say that what he points to is Lake Michigan and Chicago, but that the targets of his pointing correspond in some way to certain places, and it is to these places that he really wants to refer. In this case, two deictic spaces are involved: the "real" deictic space, and some "analogical" deictic space -the map. By pointing to an element of the map, we are referring to a corresponding element of the "real" space. The association between the two spaces is given by the cartographic projection. But analogical deixis does not necessarily require two spaces associated by some mathematical specification; in many cases, some vague resemblance is sufficient for a correspondence and hence for analogical deixis. If somebody points to his right hip and says "The car hit him here," it is the corresponding body part of some person that is referred to. In this case, there is an analogue within one deictic space.
In a similar way, we may indirectly refer to "generic" places. If a professor of medicine says to his students: "Take care that the needle is put exactly here," pointing to some spot of his glutaeus maximus, he does not really refer to that part of his glutaeus maximus nor to the corresponding part of some other specific person, but to the "generic" part of the glutaei maximi, of which he used his own as a token.
What I have briefly sketched so far are the indispensable ingredients of local deixis in everyday use. It is remarkable how well people succeed in organizing them. As a rule, we have no problem with successful identification of local denotata, although this involves a complex integration of expression information with the whole of contextual information. The ways in which deictic spaces are set up or in which possible subspaces are delimited are multivarious, but not idiosyncratic. So long as the contrary is not indicated, a speaker is entitled to assume that the listener knows the language and thus the lexical meaning of deictic expressions, that he knows to integrate expression and contextual information, and that he has eyes and thus can identify the origo.
In the following sections, we shall consider some cases in which the deictic system is operative and of major importance for the verbal task to be solved: local deixis in route directions.
A route communication refers to the complex verbal action of asking for and giving route directions. The starting point of a route communication is the fact that a person, Q, has an incomplete representation of some deictic space of a local environment, whereas another person, A, has a more complete representation, and their job is to elaborate on Q's representation. It cannot be said that nothing is shared in the deictic space involved, because Q has eyes and perhaps some knowledge, but it is not fully shared knowledge.
The first study I want to speak about is based on 2 x 20 real route communications. They were collected in th inner city of Frankfurt/Main (Figure 1 ). 5, 6 At the upper Zeil, Frankfurt's main shopping street, or at the Hauptwache (a small building of the 18th century) people were asked either for the "Alte Oper" or the "Goethehaus," both well-known 5 A more detailed report of this investigation is given in Klein (1979) . landmarks in Frankfurt. The whole action was covertly taperecorded. More than 100 route communications were recorded, some of them very noisy because of the traffic. The first 20 from each group (Alte Oper, Goethehaus), if fully understandable, were selected and transcribed for further analysis; they are labelled as 01-020 and G1-G20. The transcription is in standard orthography, with some slight touches of dialectal pronunciation for some speakers. Pauses and parallel speaking were transcribed as accurately as possible. Sometimes, more than one person answered; in this case indices are used: A 1 , A 2 , etc.
There is a clear interactive scheme of successful route communication. In the first part, Q is dominant from an interactive point of view: he has to get into contact with A, to make clear what he wants and to convince A to assume the task of giving directions. In the central part, it's A's job to describe the way (route directions proper) and to make sure that Q gets the message. In the last part, Q dominates again: he has to attest to A that his job is done, to acknowledge and to end the contact. All parts are interesting from an interactive, a cognitive, and a linguistic point of view. But in what follows, I shall only be concerned with some aspects of the middle part, the route directions proper.
Planning the Directions
In order to describe the way, A has to have some cognitive representation of the area in question, to select and to linearize some pieces of information which he takes from his cognitive representation, and to express these pieces of information with the aid of motion verbs, deictic expression, etc.
In this section, I shall briefly deal with the first two aspects. The speaker's knowledge of the area in question usually goes back to his own previous experiences: he remembers what he has seen and heard as he walked through the streets, how he turned left and right, and how the streetcar moved. All these impressions and sensations must be organized into a "cognitive map." There is a vast amount of research on this concept, and I won't discuss it here.
(See, for a recent survey, Downs & Stea, 1977) . There is indeed one point which is rarely mentioned in the literature but which plays an important role in route directions: whatever our spatial knowledge of an area might be and however it might be structured, it is usually not present or at least not fully present. We activate it on occasion.
In the case of route directions, A's cognitive map of the area in question is activated by Q's request. A then has to localize his actual position-the starting point of the route direction-and the destination on his map. Such an activated part of the whole cognitive map with a localized starting point and a localized destination point I will call the "primary plan" of the whole route direction.
Building up this primary plan may be done immediately after Q's initial request, or stepwise. The following simple description is a case of advance planning (G-2): It is clear from the whole situation that Q wants to ask for something; A first signalizes his readiness to enter the interaction (ja?). Q then specifies the goal "zum alten Opernhaus," omitting the obvious sequence "could you tell me how to get...." (or something similar). A then indicates that he is ready and competent to fulfill the request addressed to him by a very long "jaa;" he then makes a long planning pause. After that, he is able to perform his description in one stroke, interrupted only by feedback control and confirmation. When he starts, he obviously has a sufficiently clear primary plan. He is an "advance planner."
The following text is an instance of "stepwise planning" (0-17): Q Entschuldigen sie, können Sie mir sagen, wie man zur alten Oper A Q kommt ? A na, oh ja doch, (2 sec) Sie können (2 sec) hier rauf Q jaha A (2 sec) bis (6 sec) ehm, ich muss auch erst überlegen well's Q A son bissel verbaut wurde; (4 sec) Sie gehn jetzt hier eh zur Ecke Q A dann links oben über den Platz, dann gehn Sie geradeaus, das Q ja A 1st die Goethestrasse also nicht diese, sondern die nächste dann Q mhm A rauf, und dann stossen Sie direkt das ist dann auf der rech-Q mhm gut, A ten Seite das 1st dann die alte Oper das sehen Sie schon; Q dankeschön A bitte. Here too, A first signals his readiness and willingness, but he obviously starts talking before he has activated the necessary pieces of his cognitive map; this is clearly indicated by a series of pauses, ending with a statement that, first, he has to think again. After the four-second pause, his plan is clear, and he is able to linearize and to express the necessary information.
In longer and more complex route directions, there are often several interruptions of this sort --that is, after A has reached in his imagination some point, he has to "visualize" the environment at that point, and only then is he able to continue his description. Activating the entire necessary part of the cognitive map in advance or step by step are complementary techniques, and it is an open question whether they correspond to individual cognitive styles or whether their use simply depends on the complexity of the task. Short routes may allow advance planning; complex routes may require stepwise planning.
Building up a primary plan, whether in advance or stepwise, is a first prerequisite for successful directions. But all the information contained in the primary plan is not expressed, of course, since most of it is superfluous for the purpose of the required route directions. The speaker then has to select and to order those bits ana pieces he considers indispensable to the listener. We may say he has built up a "secondary plan;" this plan then underlies the linear sequence of expressions that constitutes his route description. The organizing principle of this secondary plan is that of an "imaginary tour" from the starting point to the destination.' In the course of this imaginary tour, certain salient points of the primary plan are selected, and this series of "fixed points" constitutes the backbone of the description. The directions themselves then have three descriptive components; fixed points must be introduced, directions relative to these fixed points are marked, and actions or events are indicated. This information is given by three kinds of descriptive expressions: expressions that introduce fixed points, deictic expressions which relate actions to these fixed points, and expressions for these actions or events themselves, that is, expressions that describe what happens at the given point or prescribe what Q has to do there.
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Consider the following passage from 0-1:
A.
hier vor bis zum Kaufhof; rechts ist der Kaufhof, ja? und da halten Sie sich rechts
The first fixed point is the starting point, introduced by "hier;"* relative to this point, the action to be performed is indicated: "go on to the Kaufhof;" this next fixed point Kaufhof is then introduced by "it is to the right;" then, a new position relative to that fixed point is introduced ; "da" (=at the Kaufhof), and the next action is prescribed:
The concept of an "imaginary tour" as a linearization principle was first introduced in Linde and Labov (1975) in their study of apartment descriptions. Cf. also UllmerEhrich's (1981) concept of "gaze tour" and the linearization strategies studied in Levelt (1981) . It seems to me that all these principles can be traced back to the attempt to introduce a "temporal" order into multidimensional complex information. In route directions, the obvious way to introduce such a temporal order is to imagine the series of actions to be performed.
There are various other kinds of expressions to be found in route directions, for example "feedback" signals, confirmation, comments on the difficulty of the route, etc. They will not be considered here; for a more extensive discussion, see Klein (1979) . "keep to the right," and this is continued until the destination is reached.
The use of deictic expressions. Let me turn now, after these very sketchy remarks on planning, to the third task of A, the expression of those pieces of information he thinks to be relevant. As we have seen already, deictic expressions play a crucial role in this process. Their use is marked by two characteristics:
1. Between A and Q, there is an asymmetry concerning the deictic space. A is assumed to know more about it than Q, and just this asymmetry is the starting point of the whole route communication. This does not mean, of course, that their deictic spaces are completely different; they share, for example, its perceivable part, but this is not sufficient. So, deictic reference aims at denotata which in a sense are not in the referential domain of Q at the time of utterance. Thus, A has to provide Q with some additional elements of the deictic space, and it is this which is done by introducing fixed points and giving additional information.
2. To begin with, the origo is the position of the speaker, that is, the unmarked origo. But as the description goes on, the origo is constantly shifted, although both speaker and listener more or less keep their position; but the basic reference point of all deictic terms is the imaginary position of the walker on his imaginary tour; this also concerns the imaginary direction of gaze.
The lexical meaning of deictic expressions is the unusual one. The delimitation is generally based on world knowledge (cf. section on origo above). Analogical deixis almost never occurs in the data studied here, although it might well occur in route directions, for example when maps or simple drawings are used. So, we will focus on the two components mentioned above: incomplete deictic space, and moving origo.
The deictic space of the listener has to be completed by certain selected "fixed points" -streets, places, buildings, in general, by "landmarks" (Lynch, 1960) of various kinds. This is done in four ways:
